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Choateness and the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Tax Lien Act provides that, immediately upon
the assessment' of a tax deficiency, a lien attaches to all property
of the delinquent taxpayer.2 Because a delinquency in the pay-
ment of taxes is often caused by a general deterioration of the
taxpayer's financial position, a failure to pay the tax is generally
accompanied by an inability to pay other outstanding debts in-
cluding those owing to private creditors. Accordingly, imposi-
tion of the federal tax lien generally results in a conflict be-
tween the tax claim of the federal government and private credi-
tors' claims. This conflict becomes significant if the total prop-
erty of the taxpayer is not sufficient to satisfy all the com-
peting claims. Prior to 1966 the provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code did not establish a priority among these competing
interests. Yet, decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
through application of a "choateness" doctrine, greatly favored
the tax lien over the competing interests, 3 causing an under-
mining of the security of many common financial transactions.
The 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act represents an attempt to
attain a more reasonable accommodation between the interests
of the federal government in the collection of delinquent taxes
and the needs of the business community in assuring the proper
functioning of the private credit system.4 It is also intended to
correlate the tax lien provisions with the many changes in
commercial law, most notably the wide acceptance of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which occurred since the last comprehen-
sive revision of the tax lien statute.5
1. The act of assessment is an administrative procedure which is
performed by the Internal Revenue Service. No public notice of assess-
ment is given, and the procedure is not open to public inspection.
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
3. There has been extensive writing on the topic of tax lien prior-
ity. See, e.g., Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Cam-
paign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IowA L.
REV. 724 (1965); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Govern-
ment: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE
L.J. 905 (1954); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13
TAx L. REv. 459 (1958); Wolfson, Federal Tax Liens-A Study in Con-
fusion and Confiscation, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 180 (1959); Note, 43 MwNN. L.
Rnv. 755 (1959).
4. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 Before the Committee
on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
5, 41 (1966).
5. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 4, at 37.
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The function of this Note is to review the development and
effects of the choateness doctrine under the prior federal tax
lien provisions. Thereafter, the extent to which the 1966 Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act was intended to limit the choateness doctrine
will be examined, and the consequences of this limitation will
be evaluated.
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF RELATIVE PRIORITIES
UNDER THE FORMER TAX LIEN ACT
The common law rule for determining priority between com-
peting creditors, "first in time, first in right,"6 was judicially
applied to the determination of the priority of interests com-
peting with tax liens of the federal government7 Since the
tax lien attaches at the time of assessment of the tax deficiency,
only those interests created prior to the assessment prevailed
under this rule.
However, because tax assessments were not made public, a
creditor could in good faith enter a financial agreement with a
delinquent taxpayer unaware that his interest was already sub-
ordinate to a secret tax lien. The inequities of this secret lien
resulted in congressional adoption of the notice-filing provision,8
which gave priority to mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and
judgment creditors whose interests were created prior to the
filing of the tax lien.9 The priorities of all other interests were
fixed, as before, according to the date of the tax deficiency as-
sessment.
A. EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF TmE CHOAT&SS DocTRN
As originally developed under the federal priority statute,10
6. Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177, 179 (1827).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84
(1963); United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1953).
8. For the historical development of the notice-filing provision,
see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The
Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905,
920-22 (1954).
9. 68A Stat. 779 (1954). This section was originally enacted to
remedy the harsh rule of United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893),
which allowed secret tax liens to gain priority over purchasers and
mortgagees acquiring their interest between the attaching and the filing
of the lien. See United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291,
294-95 (1961).
10. See County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
See generally Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Cam-




the doctrine of choateness required the identity of the lienor,"
the amount of the lien, 2 and the property subject to the lien13
to be known and definite before the competing interest was
deemed choate.
The time at which the interest became choate, rather than
the time the interest attached, determined priority. United
States v. Security Trust14 held the choateness doctrine deter-
minative of the relative rights of competing interests under the
tax lien act. The Court in United States v. City of New Britain 5
explicitly articulated the three requisites of choateness as ap-
plicable to statutory liens competing with the federal tax lien.
The several per curiam decisions of the Court subsequent
to New Britain, which denied priority to statutory mechanic's
liens, illustrate the application of the choateness doctrine.' 6 It
was held that unless the mechanic's lienor obtained a judgment
prior to the attachment of the tax lien his interest was inchoate
and inferior. 7 Apparently the rationale was that the lien was
merely an interim step toward the status of a judgment creditor
and until the mechanic's lienor became a judgment creditor the
amount of the lien remained uncertain.18 However, in United
States v. Vermont, 9 the Court held that a state tax lien was
11. See United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936).
12. See United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S.
353 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
13. See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946);
United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., supra note 12.
14. 340 U.S. 47 (1950). In Security Trust the Court held that the
amount of a local statutory lien, which had attached but had not been
reduced to judgment before the tax lien arose, was uncertain and thus
inchoate and junior to the federal tax lien. The effect of this decision
was to overrule at least thirty cases which had applied the federal tax
lien statute literally, giving priority to the interest which first attached.
See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 924 n.115.
15. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66, reversing 102
So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1958); United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15, reversing
134 Colo. 543, 307 P.2d 475 (1957); United States v. White Bear Brewing
Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808, reversing 224 Miss. 33, 79 So. 2d 474
(1955). See generally Note, 63 YALE L.J. 138 (1958).
17. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., supra note 16.
18. Although the per curiam decisions did not articulate a rationale,
it has been suggested that the amount of the mechanic's lien cannot be
determined until all possible defenses to the lien have been settled by
judicial decision. United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 849 (4th Cir.
1960).
19. 377 U.S. 351 (1964), affirming 317 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1963).
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sufficiently choate to prevail against the federal lien even though
it had not been reduced to judgment. However, because the Ver-
mont statutory lien itself had the force of a judgment,20 the
Vermont decision probably will not support an argument that a
statutory lien need no longer to be reduced to judgment to pre-
vail against the federal tax lien.
The Supreme Court, by per curiam decisions,21 also extended
the applicability of the choateness doctrine to consensual liens
included within the notice-filing provision. For example, in
United States v. Ball Construction Co.,22 a security agreement was
entered into prior to the attachment of the tax lien whereby
present or future funds due to a contractor were assigned to a
surety as security for its promise to guarantee the contractor's
performance. The lien was deemed inchoate and inferior to
the federal tax lien, apparently on the ground that because the
surety might be required to make payments after the tax lien
was filed the amount of the lien was uncertain.
23
In Crest Finance Co. v. United States,2 4 a subcontractor as-
signed amounts due from the general contractor as security for
loans made to the subcontractor. A tax lien attached to the
property of the subcontractor at a time when the work under
20. The Court, in the Vermont decision, stated that "the assess-
ment is given the force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed is not
paid when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor's property
to satisfy the debt." 377 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1964). See generally Weir,
Competition Among Federal and California Tax Liens and Creditor's
Liens, 17 U. So. CAL. 1965 TAx INsT. 807.
21. Crest Fin. Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 347 (1961), vacating
291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587
(1958), reversing 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1957), affirming 140 F. Supp. 60
(W.D. Tex. 1956).
22. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
23. The per curiam decision in Ball merely stated that the compet-
ing interest was inchoate. However, United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins.
Co., 374 U.S. 84, 91 (1963), explained that the amount of the surety's
lien in Ball was uncertain, and hence inchoate, at the time the federal
tax lien was filed because the surety's obligation was contingent.
Pioneer also indicated that the security interest in Ball was deemed
to be a "mortgage" within the notice-filing provision. If this is so and
the mortgage was signed prior to the time the tax lien was filed, the
policy of the notice-filing provision would seem to indicate that the
secured party in Ball should have been given priority. However, the
Court in Pioneer stated:
[W]e believe Congress intended that if out of the whole spec-
trum of state-created liens, certain liens are to enjoy the pre-
ferred status granted by [the notice-filing section], they should
at least have attained the degree of perfection required of other
liens and be choate for the purposes of the federal rule.
374 U.S. at 89.
24. 368 U.S. 347 (1961).
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the subcontract had been completed but the exact amount due
the subcontractor required ascertainment by engineering meas-
urement. The court of appeals25 held, on the authority of Ball,
that the assignee's interest was inchoate because the amount due
the subcontractor was uncertain. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General conceded that the Ball decision did
not compel a finding of inchoateness. Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court vacated the judgment. The contrary findings of
choateness in Ball and Crest may be explained by the fact that
in Ball the future contingent disbursements could not be deter-
mined at the time of tax lien filing, whereas in Crest, because
all obligations had been completed, the obligation of the con-
tractor to the subcontractor was fixed and the amount payable
to the subcontractor could have been calculated at the critical
time.26
Thus, under prior law, statutory liens such as attachment
and mechanic's liens obtained priority only if reduced to judg-
ment when the tax lien attached. Contractual liens such as se-
cured claims of mortgagees had prior.ity only if the performance
of the secured party were complete and the amount of the lien
were fixed and definitely ascertainable at the time of assessment.
However, if the contractual interest were included within the
notice-filing provision it would take priority if choate at the
time the tax lien was filed.
B. EFFECTS OF THE CHOATENESS DocTPuNE
The effect of the choateness doctrine was to subordinate cer-
tain statutory and contractual security interests without afford-
ing affected creditors a practical opportunity to protect them-
selves. Because the competition arises only when the debtor-
taxpayer is insolvent, subordination of the private creditor often
placed the risk of insolvency on the party least able to bear the
risk of loss. Often the advancement made by creditors enhanced
the value of the taxpayer's property and thus the choateness doc-
trine permitted the tax lien to appropriate, without compensa-
tion, value for which the creditor was responsible. The result
25. 291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961).
26. It has been contended that the best explanation of Crest is that
the Solicitor General conceded choatness. See Kennedy, supra note 10,
at 740.
However, in United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, at
91 n.9 (1963), the Court contrasted Ball and Crest, nothing that in Crest
the assignment and the loans were consummated prior to the accrual
and filing of the federal tax lien.
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was an undermining of security interests in competition with the
federal tax lien.27
Additional confusion was created by the conflicting priority
systems of state and federal law. Most states grant priorities
to certain creditors such as mechanics, materialmen, and local
taxing authorities. However, the choateness doctrine often de-
nied priority to these same interests. For example, state law may
give a mechanic's lien preference over a pre-existing mortgage.
If a federal tax lien were filed after a mortgage had become
choate but before a mechanic's lien on the same property had
been reduced to judgment, federal law regarded the federal tax
lien as superior to the mechanic's lien but junior to the mortgage.
Under state law, however, the mechanic's lien had priority over
the mortgage. If there were insufficient proceeds to satisfy all
the competing liens, a circuity problem resulted.28
Faced with such a circuity of lien rights problem, the Court
in United States v. City of New Britain"9 evolved a two step
analysis to resolve the dilemma. Under this approach, the fed-
eral law of priorities was applied first, and an amount equal to
the interests that take priority over the federal tax lien was set
aside to satisfy those interests. Thereafter, the federal tax lien
and the remaining subordinate liens were satisfied in that order.
If the value of the security was not sufficient to satisfy all
the claims, the amount set aside to satisfy claims superior to the
federal tax lien was allocated among the competing interests
in order of the priority as determined by state law. Thus, in
the example given, an amount sufficient to satisfy the mortgage
would be allocated subject to redistribution under state law to
27. The harsh effects of the choateness doctrine were somewhat
mitigated by judicial adoption of what has been termed the "no prop-
erty" rule. Since the federal tax lien attaches only to property or prop-
erty rights of the delinquent taxpayer, the tax lien may be limited or
defeated to the extent that under state law the taxpayer has no prop-
erty. See, e.g., Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United
States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
For example, in Aquilino, the federal government had assessed a
tax deficiency against a general contractor and had thereby perfected
its lien against proceeds of the construction contract. However, because
state law made the payments received by a contractor a trust fund for
the benefit of unpaid subcontractors, and because the subcontractors
remained unpaid, the contractor was deemed to have no property upon
which the federal lien could attach, until all subcontractors were paid.
See generalIy Kennedy, supra note 10, at 752; Comment, 24 MD. L. REV.
310 (1964).
28. See generally Oppenheim, Federal Tax Liens: Evolution and
Conflict With State Liens, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. Ruv. 494, 510 (1965-1966).
29. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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satisfy the mechanic's lien. The bizarreness of this approach is
exemplified by the fact that, in the situation given, the me-
chanic's lien is saved because of the mortgage which was junior
to it under state law. Furthermore, the mortgage may receive
none of the security whereas the purportedly junior federal tax
lien received partial or complete satisfaction. 30
III. CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATION OF THE CHOATENESS
DOCTRINE
Many years of cooperative work among the American Bar
Association, the Treasury Department, and the staff of the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation culminated in passage
of the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act. One of the major objectives
of the new act was to reform the choateness doctrine and thereby
eliminate or minimize the inequities and impediments to busi-
ness transactions which it created.31 Although the choateness
doctrine was to be reformed, the legislative history indicates that
it was not to be completely eliminated. 32 However, the extent to
which the doctrine remains is not made clear by the 1966 Act.
Indeed, the Act makes no express reference to the choateness
doctrine, and the terminology of the Act cannot be deemed deter-
minative of the question.3 It is therefore necessary to examine
the changes made by the new Act which are relevant to the
choateness doctrine, and thereby determine the extent to which
Congress intended to limit the doctrine.
In attempting to make the rules governing tax liens more
equitable and certain under the 1966 Act, Congress strengthened
the rights of private creditors competing with the tax lien.34
This is primarily accomplished by three basic changes. Section
6323 (b) of the 1966 Act specifies ten interests that are afforded
a "superpriority" status. Section 6323 (c) and (d) specify that
security interests arising under certain commercial financing
agreements are given priority over the tax lien even if they at-
30. This attempt to resolve the circuity of lien rights problem also
frustrates the judicial policy against permitting inchoate interests to
prevail against the tax lien, for the effect may be to satisfy inchoate
interests first.
31. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 4, at 64.
32. Id. at 45, 47.
33. Although §§ 6323(a), (b), (c), and (d) of the 1966 Federal
Tax Lien Act state that the federal lien "shall not be valid" against cer-
tain interests, decisions under the former act construed the same phrase
to provide that such interests would prevail over the tax lien only if
choate. See, e.g., United States v. Ball Constr. Co., supra note 21.
34. 112 CONG. REc. 21,311 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1966).
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tach after the tax lien is filed. Finally, section 6323 (a) broadens
the classification of interests included within the notice-filing
provision.
A. THE SUPERPRiORrrY INTERESTS
Section 6323 (b) of the 1966 Act defines certain limited inter-
ests that take priority over a federal tax lien even though
they arise after the tax lien has attached and notice thereof
has been filed.35 These interests are deemed "superpriorities."
Granting of superpriority status was thought to be justified
by the nature of the interests protected.36 Most of these inter-
ests involve casual and common transactions of relatively lim-
ited amount for which an individual cannot be expected to
35. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b) provides that, even though
notice of the federal tax lien has been filed, it shall not be valid against:
(1) A purchaser of securities, such as bonds and debentures, or a
holder of a security interest in such securities, provided that the pur-
chaser or holder did not have knowledge of the tax lien when the inter-
est arose. See § 6323(b) (1).
(2) A purchaser of a motor vehicle who did not have knowledge
of the tax lien at the time of purchase or before he took possession of
the vehicle, and who has not relinquished possession to the seller. See
§ 6323(b) (2).
(3) A purchaser in the ordinary course of ,business of tangible
personal property at retail, provided that the purchaser has no intent
to hinder or defeat the tax lien. See § 6323(b) (3).
(4) The purchaser of personal property such as household goods
and personal effects purchased in a casual sale for less- than $250, pro-
vided the purchaser does not have knowledge of either the tax lien or
the fact that the sale is one of a series of sales. See § 6323 (b) (4).
(5) A person with a possessory lien for repair or improvEment on
personal property who has maintained possession since the time of tax
lien filing. See § 6323 (b) (5).
(6) State and local real property and special assegsment tax liens
which, under local law, are entitled to priority over sectirity interests
that are prior in time. See § 6323 (b) (6).
(7) Mechanic's lienors who have a lien for repair or improvement
of a personal residence if the contract price does not exceed $1000. See
§ 6323(b) (7).
(8) An attorney who has a lien for reasonable fees on a judgment
in favor of the delinquent taxpayer. See § 6323(b) (8).
(9) An insurance company that has, under certain qualifications,
made loans to the insured-taxpayer on a life insurance, endowment, or
annuity contract. See § 6323(b) (9).
(10) A bank or similar institution which has made loans to the
taxpayer secured by a savings deposit or other account with that insti-
tution and evidenced by a passbook, provided that the loan was made
without knowledge of the tax lien and provided further that the pass
book has been continuously in the possession of the- lending insfitution.
See § 6323(b) (10).




check for filed tax liens prior to entering each transaction, while
other superpriority interests tend to enrich the taxpayer's prop-
erty.3 7
Because the superpriorities take priority over a tax lien even
if they arise subsequent to assessment of the tax and filing of
the lien, it seems clear that the choateness doctrine no longer
applies to any of these interests.3 8 This conclusion is supported
by decisions holding that the two superpriorities under the prior
act 39 could "take from a tax liened debtor with impunity from
the lien. '40  It is the intention of the 1966 Act to continue this
rule of impunity for superpriority interests.41
B. INTERESTS BASED ON CoMMERcIAL FINANcING TRANSACTIONS
The choateness doctrine appears to be further limited by
sections 6323 (c) and (d) of the 1966 Act dealing with commercial
financing agreements. Generally, such an agreement is entered
into by the taxpayer and a third party obligating the third
party to make future advances or obligatory payments upon
the happening of a condition precedent. These disbursements
are secured either by property existing at the time of the agree-
ment, or property to be acquired thereafter. Sections 6323(c)
and (d) of the 1966 Tax Lien Act define in detail four such com-
mercial financing arrangements and grants them priority over
the tax lien in certain circumstances.
The first 42 is an agreement between the taxpayer and a com-
mercial financier whereby the financier agrees to make loans
secured by "commercial financing security,"43 or to purchase com-
37. Compare UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, which specifies
certain perferred security interests that will be perfected without filing.
38. A written statement by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
explained certain of the proposed superpriorities under the topic of
"Expansion of classes of property entitled to protection against a filed
Federal tax lien to encompass interests which are not technically
'choate,' but which are related to an earlier, protected, security inter-
est." Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 4, at 38. See
H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1966).
39. See 68A Stat. 779-80 (1954) (possessors of interests in bonds
and securities); 78 Stat. 127 (1964) (purchasers-of motor vehicles).
40. 'Worley v. United States, 340 F.2d 500, 501 (9th Cir. 1965). See
In re Cle-Land Co., 157 F. Supp. 859 (D. Mass. 1958); United States v.
Royce Shoe Co., 137 F. Supp. 786 (D.N.H. 1956).
41. See Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 4, at 38;
H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 38, at 4.
42. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c) (1), (2).
43. Commercial financing security is defined as "(i) paper of a
kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions, (ii) accounts re-
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mercial financing security other than inventory. The secured
party is given priority over the federal lien if the agreement was
made before the tax lien was filed even though disbursement of
payment is not made until after filing. The priority, however, is
afforded only to disbursements or payments made within forty-
five days after the filing of the tax lien and before the lender or
purchaser acquires actual knowledge of the tax lien.44 If the
agreement so provides, the secured party will have priority as to
property acquired by the debtor up to forty-five days after the
tax lien is filed.45
Priority is similarly granted to a person who agrees to ad-
vance the taxpayer money to construct and improve real prop-
erty, or to finance a contract to construct or improve real prop-
erty, or to enable the taxpayer to raise or harvest farm crops
or to raise livestock.46 If such agreement is made prior to tax
lien filing, the secured party has a priority over the tax lien as
to property specified in the agreement, even though the dis-
bursements are made after the tax lien filing.47 Such priority is
recognized because the advances of the secured party will usu-
ally enhance the value of the property of the taxpayer.4
Interests arising from an obligatory disbursements contract
may also qualify for priority treatment.49 Specifically, if prior to
the filing of the tax lien, the taxpayer enters an agreement
whereby a third party may be required to make disbursements
because someone other than the taxpayer has relied on his obli-
gation,5" then the security interest of that third party in cer-
tain specified property51 takes priority over the tax lien even
ceivable, (iii) mortgages on real property, and (iv) inventory." INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (c) (2) (C).
44. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c) (2) (A).
45. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (c) (2) (B). This provision per-
mits the secured property to include after acquired property and it
allows the financier to substitute new security for security being
released.
46. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c) (1), (3).
47. The qualified property subject to the security interest will be
either the real property constructed or improved, or the proceeds of the
construction contract financed by the loan, or the crops 'and livestock
financed by the loan. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (C) (3) (B).
43. 112 CONG. REc. 21,293 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1966).
49. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (c) (1), (4).
50. An example is an irrevocable letter of credit which the issuing
bank must honor upon demand for payment by a third party, who
advances credit in reliance upon the letter. Similarly included are
agreements by a surety to guarantee the performance of construction
contracts.
51. The qualified property securing an obligatory disbursements
1967]
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though the disbursements are made after the lien is filed.
The secured party is protected because his obligation to make
disbursements after the filing of tle tax lien arises from an
agreement made prior to filing52 and, in the case of a suretyship
contract, because the surety contributes to the creation of the
asset by responding to the obligation and assuming the risk of
contract performance.
In addition to these three commercial transaction financing
agreements, section 6323 (d) of the 1966 Act grants a more gen-
eral priority to a person who, pursuant to an agreement entered
prior to the lien filing, makes disbursements to the taxpayer
without knowledge of the tax lien and within forty-five days
after its filing.53 The priority extends only to property existing
at the time of the tax lien filing and specifically covered by
the agreement.
The protection granted the secured party in the four above
described situations is available only if the interest would be
protected under local law against a judgment lien arising at the
time of tax lien filing.5 4 Since the Uniform Commercial Code
agreement must be property in existence at the time of tax lien filing
or, if it'comes into existence after that time, it must be directly traceable
to the disbursement. INT. REV. CODE of '1954, § 6323 (C) (4) (B). If the
secured party is a surety company, qualified property also includes the
proceeds of the contract the performance of which was ensured. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c) (4) (C).
Note, however, that if a taxpayer-con'tractor has a contract with the
federal government, and if the surety guarantees either payment or per-
formance of that contract, the qualified property subject to the claim of
the surety may be greatly limited. In United States v. Munsey Trust
Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947), the Court held that the federal government
may set off amounts due for taxes against amounts owed by it to the
taxpayer under a contract. Nothing in the 1966 Act was intended to
reverse the Munsey decision. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290
Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representa-
tives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1966).
52. 112 CONG. REc. 21,293 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1966).
53. The forty-five day limitation represents a compromise between
the interests of the secured plarty and the interests of the federal gov-
ernment. If no time limit existed, the taxpayer could, under the terms
of a previously existing security agreement, convert all his property
into spendable, concealable cash over an extended period of time. The
act precludes such conversion after the forty-fifth day, and the Internal
Revenue Service can shorten this period by giving notice to the secured
party. On the other hand,'if no time period were permitted, a secured
-lender would be required to check the records before each advance. The
1966 act requires him to do so only every forty-five days.
54. The Uniform Commercial Code generally requires filing of the
interest as a requisite to such protection. UNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-302. Arguably, filing is irrelevant in these situations because the
federal government is not a reliance creditor and therefore does not
[Vol. 52:198
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constitutes the local law in nearly every state, and as Congress
intended to correlate the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act with the
concepts of the Uniform Commercial Code,55 the Code will be
assumed applicable where local law is relevant.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured party must
perfect his security interest to be protected against competing
creditors. Generally, a security interest is perfected when a
financing statement has been filed and the interest has attached.56
The security interest attaches when the secured party has given
value and the debtor has rights in the collateral.5 7 Therefore,
if the secured party has filed, his security interest is per-
fected immediately upon making the first advance to the debtor.58
For purposes of determining priority against a competing secur-
ity interest or judgment lien, the perfected interest relates back
to the time of filing the financing statement.5 9 It is significant
that, under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest
may be perfected as against a subsequent judgment lien prior
to the time such security interest becomes choate.60
Indeed, it appears that the interests specifically protected by
sections 6323(c) and (d) would by necessity be inchoate at the
time of tax lien filing. Section 6323(h) (1)61 provides that a
necessarily check the records. However, filing is of evidentiary value
in determining the time at which the private interest arose. Further-
more, in cases where the competing interest is based on voluntary ad-
vancements within the forty-five day protection period, the government
may desire to give actual notice to the competing lienor and thereby
prevent the taxpayer from continuing to transform his property into
cash. It is then essential that the government be able to determine the
identity of the lienor, and this is facilitated by the filing requirement.
55. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at 37.
56. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303. However, certain types
of security interests may be perfected without the filing of a financing
statement. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
57. UNIFORM COM~MERCIAL CODE § 9-204.
58. UNIFoRMu COMVMERCIAL CODE § 9-303(1).
59. UNIFOmuW COMrMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(5) (a); William Iselin &
Co. v. Burgess & Leigh Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
60. Obligations covered by a security agreement may include fu-
ture advances whether or not the advances are given pursuant to com-
mitment. UNIFomM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(5). In such a case the
lien is inchoate because the amount of the lien is not fixed and definite.
A security agreement may also provide that collateral, whenever ac-
quired, shall secure all obligations. UNIFOm: COMMnWERCIAL CODE § 9-204
(3). Thus, the property subject to the lien may be varied and, accord-
ingly, it is not fixed and definite.
61. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (h) (1) provides as follows:
The term "security interest" means any interest in property
19671
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
security interest comes into existence when the debtor obtains
the secured property and a disbursement is made by the secured
party. Sections 6323(c) and (d) include only those transactions
in which either the identity and extent of the property subject
to the security interest will not be known or the amount of the
secured claim will not be fixed and definite. Thus, by definition
the interests protected by sections 6323(c) and (d) come into
existence and become choate subsequent to the time the tax lien
is filed.62  The apparent purpose of sections 6323(c) and (d) is
to preclude application of the choateness standards to those
interests which come within the protected categories. The legis-
lative history of the 1966 Act indicates that Congress so in-
tended.6 3
Furthermore, by conditioning priority upon a finding that
the secured party is protected under local law against a hypo-
thetical judgment lien arising at the exact time the tax lien is
filed, the rights of the federal government are equated with those
of a local judgment lien creditor. Priority over the federal
government is thus dependent upon perfection of the competing
interest under local law. To the extent that the choateness doc-
trine may be inconsistent with the local priority system,64
incorporation of the local system implicitly precludes application
of the choateness doctrine.
acquired by contract for the purpose of securing payment or
performance of an obligation or indemnifying against loss or
liability. A security interest exists at any time (A) if, at such
time, the property is in existence and the interest has become
protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien
arising out of an unsecured obligation, and (B) to the extent
that, at such time, the holder has parted with money or money's
worth.
62. Cf., United States v. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), re-
versing 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1957), affirming 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D.
Tex. 1956).
63. Various types of secured creditor interests ... are spe-
cifically defined, and ... where those interests qualify under the
definitions they are to be accorded this priority status whether
or not they are in all other respects definite and complete at the
time notice of the tax lien is filed.
112 CoxG. REc. 25,420 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966). See Hearings on H.R.
11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at 38.
Similarly, in a government memorandum from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, it was stated, "The bill attempts to solve these prob-
lems by providing specific exceptions to the choate test in new subsec-
tions (f) and (g) of section 6323." Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R.
11290, supra note 51, at 45. The memorandum was referring to an ear-
lier draft of H.R. 11256. Subsections (f) and (g) of that draft dealt with
future advances, obligatory advances, and certain financing agreements
now covered by §§ 6323(c) and (d).
64. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
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C. THE NOTICE-FILNG INTERESTS
The third change relevant to the choateness doctrine is the
amendment to the notice-filing section. Section 6323(a), the
notice-filing provision of the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, pro-
vides:
The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against
any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor,
or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof ... has been
filed .... 65
Arguably, the literal language of 6323(a) dictates that the
interests specified should take priority over a tax lien at least
until the tax lien is filed. However, the prior tax lien act in-
cluded a substantially identical notice-filing section66 which the
courts refused to apply literally and denied priority to interests
unless they were choate at the time the tax lien was filed.67
It is not clear whether Congress intended the 1966 Act to
preclude application of the choateness doctrine to the notice-
filing interests, thereby permitting a literal interpretation. The
primary purpose in amending the notice-filing provision was
apparently to include mechanic's lienors and to resolve previ-
ously existing terminology disputes.68 The legislative history of
the Act does not conclusively indicate that the purpose of section
6323 (a) is to limit the choateness doctrine. 9 Conceivably, when
Congress manifested its general intention to retain the choateness
65. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (a).
66. "[T]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as
against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until
notice thereof has been filed ... ." 68A Stat. 779 (1954) (emphasis
added).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84(1963); United States v. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
68. See Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at
37, 49; H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 38, at 11, 36.
69. For example, the House Report states that
Under decisions of the Supreme Court a mortgagee, pledgee, orjudgment creditor is protected at the time notice of the tax lien
is filed if the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the
lien, and the amount of the lien are all established at such time
. . [S]ubsection (a) of new section 6323 retains this basic rule
of Federal law ....
The Report then goes on to state that "the holder of a security interest
has priority over a Federal tax lien if, at the time notice of the tax lien
is filed, the security interest exists within the meaning of section 6323
(h) (1)." H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 38, at 35. Whether the defini-
tion of an existing security interest is subject to the choateness doctrine
is not expressly resolved. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 38,
at 2, 4; 112 CONG. REc. 25,420 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966); 112 CONG. REc.
21,293, 21,309 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1966).
19671
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
doctrine under the 1966 Act°7 0 it at least intended that the doc-
trine should not be limited by the notice-filing provision. It is
submitted, however, that in view of the nature of the interests
included within the provision and the policy implicit in this and
other related sections of the 1966 Act, the choateness doctrine
should not be judicially applied to section 6323 (a).
The interest of the mechanic's lienor was first added to the
notice-filing provisions by the 1966 Act. This interest, as spe-
cifically defined in the Act,7 1 is given protection as of the earliest
date that such a lien would become valid under local law but
not before the time at which the lienor commenced his services
or furnished his materials. 72 The potential mechanic's lienor can
thus be confident that the value he adds to the property will
not be appropriated to pay the debts of the owner, provided he
checks the records for a filed tax lien on the day to which his
future mechanic's lien will relate back.
A result of the relation back privilege is to preclude sub-
ordination of the mechanic's lien to the federal tax lien by the
application of the choateness doctrine. Even if the mechanic's
lienor is required to comply with the choateness doctrine by re-
ducing his lien to judgment, he may do so after the tax lien has
been filed and the choate claim will relate back to the date
previously set by local law. Thus, the critical factor in deter-
mining priority against a tax lien is the relation back date.
Since the choateness doctrine does not alter this priority, the
doctrine is abrogated with respect to a mechanic's lien.73
The notice-filing provision of the former tax lien act granted
a judgment creditor priority over a subsequently filed tax lien.
However, the interest of a judgment creditor was deemed incho-
ate by the courts unless the creditor also obtained a lien against
specific property,74 thereby making the property subject to the
claim more certain and definite. Thus, the term "judgment
70. See note 42 supra.
71. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 6323 (h) (2) provides in part:
The term "mechanic's lienor" means any person who under
local law has a lien on real property... for services, labor, or
materials furnished in connection with the construction or im-
provement of such property.
72. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6323(h) (2).
73. Compare this to the superpriority interests of § 6323(b), which
will prevail against the tax lien regardless of the time they become
choate.
74. See, e.g., Fore v. United States, 339 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 912 (1965); Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F.2d 178 (3rd
Cir. 1956); Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1957). Cf.
United States v. Security Trust & Savings :Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
[Vol. 52:198
FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT
creditor" was judicially rewritten to denote a "judgment lien
creditor."
The 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act incorporated the term "judg-
ment lien creditor" into section 6323 (a). Arguably, Congress by
adopting this term, approved application of the choateness doc-
trine to this extent.
Perhaps the most significant new term added to the 1966
notice-filing provision is "holder of a security interest." Under
the prior act the terms "mortgagee" and "pledgee" were used.
The substitution of "holder of a security interest," which in-
cludes mortgagees and pledgees, was intended to replace the
former terms with a more general term used in the Uniform
Commercial Code.75
The term "security interest" is defined in section 6323(h)
(1) to be an interest in property acquired by contract for the
purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation.
The Uniform Commercial Code definition of a "security inter-
est '7 6 is closely analogous. The security interest is deemed to
exist, under the Tax Lien Act, only after the secured property
exists, the security interest is protected under local law against a
judgment lien, and the secured party has made disbursements.
Thus the requisites to the existence of a security interest under
the Act are roughly parallel to the conditions precedent to the
attachment and' perfection of a security interest under the
Uniform Commercial Code.77  -
Whether or not a "holder- of a security interest" under
section 6323 (a) is also required to comply with the requisites of
choateness is suggested by reference to sections 6323 (c) and (d).
As previously noted, the 1966 Act negates application of the cho-
ateness doctrine to interests within sections 6323(c) and (d).
Yet the practical differences between an inchoate interest which
would take priority under subsections (c) and (d) and an in-
75. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290; suprd note 51, at 3-4.
76. "'Security interest' means an 'interest in persohal fproberty
or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (37).
77. A security interest is perfected and accordingly _protected
against a subsequently arising judgment- lien when a financing state-
ment has been filed if necessary and when the security interest has
attached. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-303, 9-302. See William
Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659(Sup. Ct. 1967). The security interest will attach when the secured
property exists and when the secured party has made a disbursement.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204.
CIAL CODE § 9-204.
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terest which would be inferior under subsection (a), if the cho-
ateness doctrine is applied, does not suggest such drastically dif-
ferent legal consequences.
Illustrative is the common financing agreement under which
a commercial factor agrees to make future disbursements to a
manufacturer secured by the inventory of the manufacturer.
In such a situation, the relative tinming of the initial disburse-
ment and tax lien filing would seem fortuitous. Yet application
of the choateness doctrine to section 6323(a) imposes dramatic
differences. For example, if the initial disbursement is made
after the tax lien is filed, and assuming the other qualifica-
tions are met,78 the secured party would take priority under
section 6323(c). However, if the initial disbursement is made
prior to the tax lien filing, the rights of the commercial factor
are based on section 6323 (a) 7 and application of the choateness
doctrine would prevent the factor from obtaining priority.s 0
The anomoly of this situation is even more apparent in situa-
tions involving a real property construction agreement or an ob-
ligatory disbursements agreement within section 6323(c). In
such cases the secured party has priority even though the dis-
bursements are made subsequent to tax lien filing and with
actual knowledge of the filed tax lien. However, if disburse-
ments are made prior to filing and without knowledge of the
secret tax lien, the tax lien takes priority if the choateness doc-
trine applies.
78. Specifically, the commercial factor must have filed a financing
statement before the tax lien was filed, UNIoM CoMMWERCIAL CODE §§
9-303, 9-302, and the manufacturer must have rights in the secured
property, UNIFORMV COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204. Note that under the
1966 Tax Lien Act the property securing a commercial transaction fi-
nancing agreement may also include after acquired property. INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 6323 (c) (2) (B). Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-204(3).
79. Assuming that the same qualifications specified in note 78 supra
are met, the security interest will come into existence at -the time of
the first disbursement. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(h) (1) (A),(B). Since the initial disbursement is made prior to tax lien filing,
§§ 6323(c) and (d), which only grant priority protection to those inter-
ests which come into existence after tax lien filing, is inapplicable.
Section 6323 (a), on the other hand, applies to security interests existing
before tax lien filing.
80. Since the agreement contemplates further disbursements after
tax lien filing, the amount of the secured party's claim is neither fixed
nor definite and, accordingly, it is inchoate by federal standards. See
United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); Crest Fin. Co.
v. United States, 368 U.S. 347 (1961); United States v. Ball Constr. Co.,
355 U.S. 587 (1958).
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No justification exists for this harsh distinction favoring dis-
bursements made after tax lien filing. Indeed, the policy of
sections 6323 (c) and (d) of the 1966 Act is that certain commer-
cial transactions entailing a protected security interest and sub-
sequent disbursements should be afforded priority over the tax
lien. Application of the choateness standards to a substantially
similar holder of a security interest seeking priority under
section 6323(a) would frustrate the policy implicit in sections
6323(c) and (d).
Arguably, by negating the application of choateness to trans-
actions covered by sections 6323(c) and (d) Congress merely
singled out commercial financing agreements for special protec-
tion and no analogy can be drawn between these interests and
interests included within section 6323(a).1' However, it ap-
pears that Congress intended these sections to be construed in
pari materia.82 If the commercial financing agreements are not
subject to the requisites of choateness, certainly the notice-
filing interests should be similarly protected. It is not logical
that certain security interests which, by their very nature, are
incomplete at the critical time should receive greater priority
against the tax lien than similar security interests which are
complete.83
81. Congress noted that the §§ 6323(c) and (d) interests are pro-
tected because they entail transactions expected to enhance the value
of the property or because the secured party is obligated to make dis-
bursements after the filing of the tax lien. 112 CoNe. REc. 21,293 (daily
ed. Sept. 12, 1966). However, the commercial financing agreements
given priority under §§ 6323(c) (2), (4) and (d) do not necessarily
enhance the value of the taxpayer's property any more than a security
interest or the work resulting in a mechanic's lien under § 6323(a).
Furthermore, the interests defined in §§ 6323 (c) (2) and (3) and § 6323
(d) generally do not obligate the secured party to make disbursements
after the tax lien has been filed. Thus, the combined effect of these two
rationales does not justify favored treatment for these specified inter-
ests to the exclusion of the notice-filing interests.
82. The House Hearings note that advances made under financing
agreements secured by commercial financing security will be deemed to
have priority if they arise within forty-five days after tax lien filing.
It then goes on to state that "if notice has not been filed they will, of
course, be protected as security interests against the unfiled Federal
lien." Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at 38.
83. An interest is deemed a "security interest" within the protec-
tion of § 6323(a) only if the secured property is in existence at the
time of tax lien filing and then only to the extent that the secured party
has parted with money or money's worth. INT. Rsv. CoDE of 1954, §
6323(h) (1). The interests protected by §§ 6323(c) and (d), on the other
hand, include agreements in which either the secured property may not
exist at the time of tax lien filing or the secured party has not parted
with money or money's worth.
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Furthermore, the policy of protecting reliance creditors
against secret liens, which was the -very basis for adoption of
the former notice-filing provision, would similarly be frustrated.
If the choateness doctrine is applied, the secured party under
section 6323(a) would be inferior to a tax lien unless he either
completed his performance under the contract or made the ob-
ligation fixed and ascertainable by the time the tax lien was
filed. Because it is unlikely that he will be informed of the tax
lien until notice thereof is filed, and since his obligation must be
final at that time, the notice given by the-filing would not pro-
vide the intended protection.
8 4
The only notice-filing term retained unaltered by section
6323 (a) is that of a "purchaser." Of significance is the fact
that under the former act courts seemingly did not attempt to
determine whether or not a purchaser's interest was choate.
Rather emphasis was placed on the Treasury Regulation's defini-
tion of a purchaser,8 5 and if an interest was deemed to be
within this definition when the tax lien was filed it took pri-
ority over the lien. Thus, a competing purchaser was held to
prevail against the federal lien where, at a time prior to tax
lien filing, he acquired property or an interest in property 8 for
consideration 7 that was both present 8 and valuable.8 9
There is no indication-that- - Congress intended -to abolish
84. It should be noted that the priority accorded disbursements
made after tax lien filing as part of an agreement which also involved
disbursements made prior to lien filing is not clearly resolved by the
1966 act. It is arguable that any adirances after filing would not receive
protection. Even assuming that the choateness doctrine were not appli-
cable to § 6323 (a), that section only grants priority to the extent that
the secured party has actually made disbursements at the time the tax
lien is filed. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (h) (1) (B). It seemingly
does not grant priority for subsequent disbursements. Sections 6323 (c)
and (d) grant priority only to those security interests which come into
existence after tax lien filing. Since a security interest comes into ex-
istence when both the secured property exists and disbursements have
been made, see INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h) (1) (A) and (B), the
security interest will exist prior to filing. Consequently, the claim based
on the- subsequent disbursements is not within the literal construction
of §§ 6323(a), (c) or (d) and may not be protected.
85. "The term 'purchaser" means a person who, for a valuable pre-
sent consideration, acquires property or an interest in property." Treas.
Reg. § 301.6323-1(a) (2) (a)- (1954).86. See United States v. Boston & Berlin Trans. Co., 188 F. Supp.
304 (D.N.H. 1960).
87. See United States v. Hoper, 242 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1957).
88. National Ref. Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1947);
See United States v. Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 140 F. Supp. 286
(M.D. Penn. 1956).
89. Enochs v. Smith, 359 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1966).
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this approach to the determination of a purchaser's priority.
On the contrary, in view of the general policy of the Act to limit
rather than expand the choateness doctrine,90 and as the ele-
ments of this former definition of purchaser were incorpor-
ated into the 1966 Act,91 the apparent intent of Congress was
to grant protection to those interests coming within the definition
of the term "purchaser" prior to the time of tax lien filing,
without reference to the degree of choateness.
In general, the priority granted by section 6323(a) to a me-
chanic's lienor, a holder of a security interest, and a purchaser,
like that granted to the section 6323(c) and (d) interests, is
premised on the existence of protection under local law against
certain hypothetical competing interests existing at the time of
tax lien filing.9 2 The effect of this incorporation of local law is
to preclude application by the courts of a conflicting system such
as that created by the choateness doctrine. Thus, future appli-
cation of this doctrine to section 6323 (a) would be inconsistent
with the provisions and policy of the Tax Lien Act.
It is therefore concluded that when a private creditor of a
delinquent taxpayer has an interest protected by section 6323,
subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of the 1966 Federal Tax Lien
Act, the relative priority between this interest and the tax lien
should not be determined by application of the choateness doc-
trine. Rather, it is submitted that Congress substituted a defi-
nitional approach. If an interest qualifies within the definition
of an interest protected by subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of
section 6323, it is to be afforded the priority status granted by
the respective subsection whether- or not it is in all other re-
spects choate at the time the tax lien is filed.
9 3
90. See Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at 64.
91. "The term 'purchaser' means a person who, for adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, acquires an interest ..
in property which is valid under local law against subsequent purchasers
without actual notice." INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(h) (6).
92. The significant factor in determining the priority afforded a
mechanic's lienor against any competing interest is the relation back
privilege which, under the new Act, is determined by local law. INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h) (2). Similarly, a security interest is by
definition one that under local law will prevail against a subsequent
judgment lien. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (h) (1). Finally, the 1966
Tax Lien Act adopts the definition of purchaser contained in Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6323-1 (a) (2) (a), but adds that the interest must be valid under
local law against subsequent purchasers without notice. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 6323 (h) (6).
93. See H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966); 112 CoNG.
REc. 25,420 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966). Once this priority has been estab-
lished it may also extend to the costs and expenses of preserving the
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF LIMITING THE CHOATENESS
DOCTRINE
A. IMPACT UPON FEDERAL TAX COLLEcTION
Although the choateness doctrine often worked injustice
upon third parties, it nevertheless served a useful and important
purpose. Taxes are a necessity of government, and their prompt
and certain availability is an imperious need.9 4 The tax lien,
which is an exercise of Congress' constitutional power "to lay
and collect taxes,"95 is essential to the fulfillment of this govern-
mental need. Consequently, private and local interests should
not be permitted to undermine the exercise of this power by
means of competing liens which are uncertain in amount and
which attach at an indefinite or arbitrary time to unascertained
property.9 6
The 1966 Act, while modifying the choateness doctrine, does
not abandon the policy which motivated its development. The
1966 Act does not permit vague and contingent interests to under-
mine and frustrate tax collection. All interests included within
the priority definitions are characterized by a high degree of
specificity and perfection.
For example, purchasers, by definition, have an interest in
specific property and the amount of this interest can be ab-
solutely determined by the consideration paid therefor. A
holder of a security interest has a priority right only if the
secured property exists and only to the extent that he has parted
with money or money's worth. Thus, at the time of the tax lien
filing the property subject to the secured party's lien and the
amount of that lien is definitely ascertainable. The property
security interest if local law gives such item the same priority as the
lien or security interest to which it relates. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §
6323 (e).
94. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935).
95. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. See Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S.
338 (1943); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 227 F.2d 359 (7th
Cir. 1955).
96. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954),
where the Court suggested that potential impairment of federal stand-
ing may have been the motivating factor beiind the development of the
general and unperfected lien doctrine.
Without some limitation, a situation could arise in which a lender
is able to loan money indiscriminately to a taxpayer long after a tax
lien is filed and thereby give those advances the priority of an earlier
mortgage. "The choate requirement has thus served a useful and im-
portant purpose and would be retained by the bill." Hearings on H.R.
11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at 47.
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subject to a mechanic's lien is likewise known, and the amount
of the lien can thereafter be determined by calculation or by
reducing it to a judgment. 7 Moreover, all judgment lien credi-
tors by definition meet the requisites of choateness.
The priority claims of creditors competing with the federal
government under section 6323 (c) extend only to specific, "qual-
ified property" determined by a contractual agreement and lim-
ited by the Act. Protection under section 6323 (d) extends only
to secured property previously designated and in existence at
the time the tax lien is filed. Furthermore, the protected
disbursements made pursuant to section 6323(c) (2) or (d) must
be made within a restricted time period.
Finally, most interests given priority are required to be pro-
tected under local law against judgment creditors. Thus, to pre-
vail against the tax lien the competing interest must be suffi-
ciently fixed and definite to prevail against other local credi-
tors.08
B. IMPACT UPON THE CiRcurrY OF LIEN RIGHTS PROBLEM
The doctrine of choateness formerly permitted courts to
determine the relative priority of interests competing with the
federal tax lien without regard to state or local priority rules.
Exclusion of the choateness doctrine from the interests spe-
cifically defined in the 1966 Act, while also requiring the inter-
ests to possess a priority status under local law, has brought the
priority system into accord with the state rules of priority.99
97. It should also be noted that a limited superpriority is given to
mechanic's liens for certain repairs and improvements of residential
property not in excess of $1000. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6323(b) (7).
This eliminates the necessity searching for filed tax liens prior to under-
taking small repair projects for home owners.
98. The significance of this requirement is evidenced by applica-
tion of the 1966 tax lien act to the facts of United States v. Ball Constr.
Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958). It has been contended that the Ball decision,
which was likely a prime force behind adoption of § 6323 (c), would be
reversed in favor of the surety under that section. Creedon, The Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act of 1966, 20 A.B.A. SEcT. TAx. BULL. 101, 121-22 (1967).
However, the interest of the surety had not been perfected under local
law against competing creditors, see R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140
F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex. 1956); Note, 43 MINN. L. REv. 755, 767 (1959),
and therefore the Ball decision would likely remain unchanged.
99. The Supreme Court has stated that it would be contrary to the
federal policy of uniformity in federal tax laws to permit the diverse
rules of various states to determine relative priority of federal tax liens.
United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States,
384 U.S. 323, 331 (1966); United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 270
(1965). However, this alleged diversity is minimized by adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code in nearly every state.
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The result is a substantial elimination of the conflicting two-
priority system. Accordingly, the major circuity of lien rights
problem is alleviated.
Specifically, the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act affords the same
protection to mechanic's liens against unfiled tax liens as that
given to competing security interests. 100 Thus, in the circuity
situation discussed earlier,'' the mechanic's lien for services
commenced before the mortgage is perfected will take priority
over the mortgage which, in turn, will take priority over a
subsequently filed tax lien.10 2
C. INTERESTS REMAINING SUBJECT TO THE CHOATENESS DoCTRINE
Under the 1966 Tax Lien Act, the choateness doctrine will
be applied to those interests not specifically included within sec-
tion 6323. Thus, attachment liens, 03 garnishment liens, 0 4 and
100. Similarly the act provides superpriority status to those state real
property tax liens which are granted preferential treatment under local
law against competing interests. The combined effect of these two pro-
visions is to completely eliminate the circuity of lien rights problem
that existed in United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
101. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
102. Parenthetically, it should be noted that a limited circuity of
lien rights problem may still arise under the provisions of the 1966 Act.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (h) (2) permits a mechanic's lien to relate
back to the date that work was commenced or supplies furnished. How-
ever, some state laws give the mechanic's lien: a relation back to an
earlier time. If a mortgage is perfected during the period between the
different dates to which relation back is permitted, state law may give
the mechanic's lien a priority over the mortgage whereas the federal
law will not because the-mortgage arose before the date of relation back
permitted by § 6323(h) (2). Furthermore, if the tax lien were filed
after the mortgage was perfected but before the date to which the
mechanic's lien relates back under § 6323 (h) (2), the mortgage but not
the mechanic's lien would be superior to the tax lien whereas local law
would give the mechanic's lien priority over the mortgage. The result
is a circuity of lien rights.
If a circuity problem does arise, it likely will be resolved in a
manner similar to that articulated in the New Britain decision. United
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). See United States v.
Buffalo Sav. Bank, 371 U.S. 228 (1963), where the Supreme Court re-
versed per curiam because of the failure of the lower court to apply the
New Britain resolution to a circuity problem.
The American Bar Association recognized that the New Britain rule
was not completely equitable, but was preferable to any possible alte'-
native. Consequently, it recommended that the rule be confirmed by
statute. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at 108.
The 1966 Act, however, makes no reference to the New Britain reso-
lution.
103. See United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States
v. Security Trust, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
104. See United States v. Liverpool & London Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215
(1955).
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landlord's distress liens'0 5 are still required to be choate and,
because these interests are not included within the notice-filing
provision, they must be choate before the tax deficiency is as-
sessed. This does not seem unfair. These creditors generally
have not advanced credit in reliance on the property subject to
the tax lien. Therefore, they do not have the same equitable
position against the government as that of contract lienors or of
those who extend credit secured by specific property.
The possessor of an interest which remains subject to the
choateness doctrine, however, may still prevail against the tax
lien even though his competing interest is inchoate. Under the
former act, a competing interest could prevail by a showing that
the security was not property of the taxpayer to which the tax
lien could attach. 0 6 The definition of property is a matter
governed by state and local law, and the 1966 Tax Lien Act did not
reflect in any way on the question of what constitutes property
subject to the tax lien.10 7
V. CONCLUSION
The 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act appears to reach a reasonable
accommodation between the interest of the federal government
in collecting delinquent taxes and the right of taxpayers and
third party creditors whose interests are affected. Moreover,
it adjusts the tax lien provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
to modern commercial practices.
Under the 1966 Act, the federal government will still take
priority over competing interests that are not specifically defined
and that are not definite and complete at the critical time. The
interests which prevail against the federal government will either
be choate and first in time to the tax lien, or they will be within
the specific provisions of the Act, in which case the interests
have attained a high degree of certainty and specificity. Al-
though certain interests are given an absolute exemption from
the tax lien, they are generally transactions involving relatively
limited monetary amounts in situations in which it is unreason-
able to require the parties to check records.
The creditor or commercial financier may now be assured
that the substance of his disbursements as well as the security
for these disbursements will not be confiscated by the federal
105. See United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
106. See note 27 supra.
107. Hearings on. H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, supra note 51, at 48;
H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 93, at lln.2.
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government to pay the delinquent taxes of his debtor. The
creditor may check for a filed tax lien and, if no lien is filed, he
may thereafter enter a financing agreement with the taxpayer.
By adopting an agreement that qualifies within the specific pro-
visions of the 1966 Act, he can be confident that his secured prop-
erty will not be subject to the tax lien.
